AIDive

Pack vidéo

Le kit d'auto-audit REA : les prompts exacts, le tableau de tri et le correctif du Worker

8 min de lecture

TL;DR et verdict

  • Pointez REA sur votre propre app livrée avant que quelqu'un d'autre le fasse, et faites-le depuis un bac à sable jetable. Les notes de sécurité de REA disent que ce n'est pas un bac à sable, donc le portable qui contient vos clés est le mauvais endroit.
  • Notre audit d'aidive.dev a donné 15 résultats. La vraie fuite était un endpoint d'inscription sans frein : n'importe quel site pouvait faire abonner n'importe quelle adresse à notre liste mail via le navigateur de ses visiteurs.
  • Les six règles : le lancer là où il ne peut pas nuire, lui donner une URL exacte avec toute écriture bloquée, trier chaque résultat avant d'en corriger un, vérifier ce que livre votre bundle, mettre un frein sur chaque endpoint ouvert, puis relancer et vérifier à la main avant la pull request.
  • Le kit contient les deux prompts utilisés (prompt-1-audit.md, prompt-2-fix.md), notre vrai tableau de tri (triage-table-example.md), le changement du Worker (worker-fix.diff), les headers de sécurité (_headers) et la vérification du bundle (check-client-bundle.mjs).
  • N'auditez que des logiciels que vous possédez ou que vous êtes autorisé à examiner. C'est le disclaimer de REA lui-même, et le viser sur soi-même reste dans ce cadre.

Synthèse sourcée

Ce qu'est REA et comment l'installer. La dernière version au moment de notre essai était rea-agents 6.5.0, datée du 2026-10-14 s22. L'installation se fait avec npx rea-agents setup --client claude_code, et demande Node 22.19 ou plus récent s1. Épinglez la version : il a sorti six versions en environ une semaine. Installez-le uniquement depuis le paquet officiel, car de fausses copies du dépôt ont circulé.

Il charge beaucoup d'outils. Les mainteneurs indiquent que le serveur expose 172 outils et environ 520 KB de schémas, et que définir REA_MCP_INPUT_SCHEMA_PROFILE=compact est la solution quand le contexte est saturé s7.

Règle 1, le lancer là où il ne peut pas nuire. Les notes de sécurité le disent clairement : « This is not a sandbox » s4. Le disclaimer limite l'usage aux logiciels que vous possédez ou que vous êtes autorisé à examiner s1. Lors de notre essai du bac à sable cloud, une app neuve avait une preview en ligne en 4 min 30, et les preuves de test sont restées dans la session au lieu d'atteindre la pull request s5. Si une app Next.js neuve s'affiche mais que rien ne répond derrière une URL de preview, la cause est le blocage des origines de dev, et le correctif tient en une ligne allowedDevOrigins s15.

Règle 2, une URL exacte. Pour un site web, vous lancez vous-même le navigateur sur un port de débogage loopback et REA s'y attache via CDP. Il ne lance jamais le navigateur. Les valeurs de stockage, les headers et les corps JSON sont masqués, alors que le texte des scripts et les query strings ne le sont pas s2. Si vous dites seulement « mon app », la skill demande laquelle.

Règle 3, triez avant de corriger. La skill demande exactement ça : « Every conclusion must distinguish observations, inferences, and unknowns. Cite Evidence IDs » s3. Notre tableau de tri ajoute un passage de plus après la lecture de la source : vraie fuite, voulu par conception, ou faux positif.

Règle 4, une barrière que le navigateur applique est une suggestion. OWASP le formule ainsi : « Access control is only effective in trusted server-side code » s11. Un flag localStorage posé sur un contenu déjà présent dans la page est un choix d'UX, pas un contrôle d'accès. Décidez à voix haute si c'est une fuite ou une demande douce volontaire.

Règle 5, chaque endpoint ouvert qui dépense l'argent de quelqu'un d'autre reçoit une limite. OWASP cite l'absence de plafond de dépense sur un service tiers comme une façon pour une API d'être vulnérable s12. Le binding de rate limit de Cloudflare accepte une période de 10 ou 60 secondes, et la documentation le qualifie de « permissive, eventually consistent » et de système de comptage non précis s13. L'endpoint de double opt-in de Brevo est la réponse la plus solide à quelqu'un qui soumet l'adresse d'une autre personne s14.

Règle 6, vérifiez la relance à la main. Un test de terrain de REA sur une app de bureau a signalé 0 point d'entrée preload là où l'app en avait 2 s6. Une relance au vert prouve donc peu tant que vous n'avez pas rejoué chaque correctif vous-même avec curl.

Ce que nous avons trouvé sur notre propre site. Ces chiffres viennent de notre propre essai, pas d'une source.

  • L'audit avant les correctifs a duré 12 min 41 s et n'a envoyé aucune requête d'écriture.
  • Le garde-fou du navigateur a bloqué 6 tentatives du script d'analytics, et aucune n'a atteint le formulaire d'inscription.
  • La config du site était livrée à chaque visiteur, avec l'ID de la liste mail et les limites du bot de commentaires : un plafond quotidien de 100 réponses et 5 erreurs pour déclencher l'interrupteur de sécurité.
  • La PR de correctif a fait répondre /api/subscribe 403 sans le bon Origin, 429 au-delà de 5 requêtes par 60 s par IP cliente, et 400 sans consentement.
  • Le code client a perdu 78 953 octets de JavaScript par page une fois qu'il n'importait plus que le nom et les locales (532 octets).
  • Les tests du Worker passent 9/9. L'ancien Worker en échouait 6.
  • La barrière email sur les packs gratuits reste en place volontairement. Les packs sont gratuits et publics, et un formulaire cassé ne doit jamais les cacher.

Code

  • prompt-1-audit.md

We own aidive.dev and this repo is its source (the Next.js site in engine/site, the Cloudflare Worker in engine/site/worker). Audit what the SHIPPED site gives away to an outsider, with REA (Reverse Engineer Anything, github.com/morluto/rea). Install it only from the official npm package, rea-agents.

1. Install: npm i -g rea-agents@6.5.0, then rea setup --skill-client claude_code --yes --json, with REA_MCP_INPUT_SCHEMA_PROFILE=compact. If REA's MCP tools do not load in this session, use the rea CLI equivalent of each tool.
2. Start headless Chromium with --remote-debugging-port=9222 --remote-debugging-address=127.0.0.1 --user-data-dir=/tmp/rea-chrome, and open https://aidive.dev/club/ then one free resource page under https://aidive.dev/club/free-resources/.
3. Run REA on those pages: list_browser_targets, inspect_web_page, analyze_web_bundle, capture_web_screenshot. Export the scripts to a new directory outside the repo.
4. Write audit/rea-before.md: one row per finding with its Evidence ID, what it is, whether it is an observation, an inference or an unknown, and how bad it would be. Do not open the source before this step is done: the report is what a stranger sees.
5. Only then read the source and add a column per finding: real leak, by design, or false positive, with the file it comes from.

Rules: never send a POST or any write request to aidive.dev (it is production and the form writes to a real mailing list). Change no app code in this chat yet. Note how long each step took at the end of the report. Commit audit/rea-before.md.

prompt-1-audit.md on GitHub

: le prompt du chat d'audit. Une URL exacte, toute écriture bloquée, rapport écrit avant d'ouvrir la source. -

prompt-2-fix.md

Good report. Now fix the real leaks from audit/rea-before.md in this branch, then prove it.

1. F06, F05, S3 in engine/site/worker/index.ts: reject a request whose Origin header is not https://aidive.dev (403); add a Cloudflare Workers Rate Limiting binding (ratelimits in wrangler.template.jsonc and in the jsonc that scripts/channel.mjs writes, keyed on the client IP, 5 requests per 60 s, 429 above); require a consent flag in the body, send it from the email gate form, and store the consent time with the contact; drop updateEnabled.
2. F08: the browser must only get what it reads. Split the config so client components (email-gate, locale-switcher) import a small client-safe object (name and locales), and keep club, autoReply, contentDir and the other locales' copy out of the client bundle.
3. U1: add security headers for the static assets (a _headers file in public/: Content-Security-Policy with frame-ancestors 'none', X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security), and check the pages still render.
4. F01, F02, F03, S1, S2: the club email gate is a deliberate soft ask (the packs are free and public on GitHub, and a broken form must never hide them). Do not move content behind the server. Write that decision in audit/decisions.md, finding by finding. Same for F13 (the Cloudflare beacon is a dashboard setting, not the repo).
5. Run tsc and lint, then pnpm build. Test the Worker locally only (wrangler dev serving out/): a POST without the right Origin gets 403, a sixth POST within 60 s gets 429, a POST without consent gets 400, a valid one gets 204 with Brevo mocked. Never call aidive.dev or the real Brevo API.
6. Re-run the same REA steps against the local build and write audit/rea-after.md with the same table and a before/after column. Check each fixed finding by hand with curl too, because REA can miss things.
7. Commit and open a pull request whose body links both reports and lists what changed, what stays by design, and what is still unknown. Note the timings again.

prompt-2-fix.md on GitHub

: le prompt du chat de correction. La vérification de l'Origin, le rate limit, le flag de consentement, le découpage de la config, les headers et un plan de test uniquement en local. -

triage-table-example.md

# REA audit of aidive.dev: what the shipped site gives away

Date: 2026-10-17 (UTC). Tool: REA `rea-agents@6.5.0`, installed from npm.
Targets: `https://aidive.dev/club/` and `https://aidive.dev/club/free-resources/claude-code-limit-cut-levers/`.

The first five columns of the findings table are the outsider view. They were written from REA evidence
and the shipped scripts only, before any source file of this repository was opened
(commit `7e10d79` has that version alone). The last two columns, **Verdict** and **Source**, were added in step 5 after reading the source.

## Summary

- **The email gate does not protect the packs.** Each pack reaches every visitor in three ways without an email:
  the page HTML (F01), a raw markdown copy at `/club/free-resources/<slug>.md` (S1), and the pack files under `/files/` (S2).
  The gate is a client-side overlay over a static export (F02, F03).
- **`/api/subscribe` writes to the real Brevo list with no brake.** It has no rate limit, no CAPTCHA, no Origin check and no double opt-in, and it records no consent (F05, F06).
  Any website can make its visitors' browsers subscribe any address.
- **The whole site config ships to the browser** (F08). This includes values that are not public elsewhere, because this repository is private:
  the Brevo list ID, the YouTube auto-reply limits and the build layout.
- **No response security headers** (U1, now real): no CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, nosniff or Referrer-Policy.
- **Clean:** no source maps, no secrets or API keys in the bundles, no storage, no cookies, and nothing in the console.

## Evidence

| ID | REA operation | Target | Evidence ID |
|----|---------------|--------|-------------|
| E1 | `list_browser_targets` | browser | `ev_bb5764a587b84a36cb11d40f6cd96b2acea26e1e412d0b1d114d2950dd16aab0` |
| E2 | `inspect_web_page` | /club/ | `ev_d84a8cc1436925f002108882c2472e47e744b42097ea8a1c7ff4b03748c329e3` |
| E3 | `inspect_web_page` | free resource | `ev_f08acdc2dba3b837ed1df24b57c80c9528982f9cac80eb5c042963573c743a0b` |
| E4 | `analyze_web_bundle` | /club/ | `ev_ab551792ba284eef2b91e5e43ddc618c92baadcea1050b9bf117bc9bd32ab98a` |
| E5 | `analyze_web_bundle` | free resource | `ev_9e24cc703943623efa2f31750c89ca27ccd5b95a55225bef7be0257a80cfb16f` |
| E6 | `capture_web_screenshot` | /club/ | `ev_c029b86ad2b4a92a0ef45b529691c4bc3f1d1a89b0e340cc0d05f6d51003f65e` |
| E7 | `capture_web_screenshot` | free resource | `ev_72b418d989c042d6320c5473f7d31acd660b242213fea09c97fd33a678bd756e` |
| E8 | `export_web_scripts` | /club/ capture (E2) | `ev_397383a4930fe6fbd9bf7568856f9e9f52d32b4bceba66e348e1738110e421a4` |
| E9 | `export_web_scripts` | free resource capture (E3) | `ev_7b2177f6a302c5971df051a01970d8c63d29286d8a47244fd6c4dacfc59735e3` |
| G1 | not REA: request log of the CDP write guard (see Method) | both pages | `/tmp/rea-audit/guard/requests.jsonl` |
| H1 | not REA, step 5: HEAD requests and anonymous GitHub API reads (see Method) | listed per row | , |

Chunk names below are the shipped file names under `https://aidive.dev/_next/static/chunks/`, as exported by E8 and E9.
Source paths are relative to the repository root. `engine/site/` is shortened to `site/`.

## Findings

Kind: **Observation** = seen directly in the evidence. **Inference** = concluded from what was seen.
**Unknown** = REA could not see it. Severity is "how bad it would be" for the site: High, Medium, Low, Info, None.

Verdict (step 5): **Real leak** = the source confirms it and nothing shows it is intended.
**By design** = the source shows it is intended or unavoidable. **False positive** = the source contradicts the outsider reading.

| # | Evidence | Finding | Kind | Severity | Verdict (step 5) | Source |
|---|----------|---------|------|----------|------------------|--------|
| F01 | E3, E7, E9 (inline script `source-1`) | The whole gated pack ships to every visitor. The page HTML carries the article (TL;DR, measurements table, "Do this Monday" checklist, sources, FAQ) in its inline RSC payload. While the email dialog is open, the accessibility tree exposes about 11.6 KB of that text (13 headings, 60 table cells). The screenshot shows it only blurred. View source, reader mode, a screen reader, `curl` or JS turned off all read it without an email. | Observation | High (the email gate protects nothing) | **Real leak.** The site is a static export, and the pack is rendered at build time into the HTML. The gate can only hide it, not withhold it. | `site/next.config.ts` (`output: 'export'`), `site/src/lib/resources.ts` (`renderResourceHtml`), `site/src/components/pages/resource-page.tsx`, `site/src/app/(default)/club/free-resources/[slug]/page.tsx` |
| F02 | E9, chunk `1t27yr-aialmx.js` (`EmailGate`) | The gate is client-side only. It opens 1500 ms after load unless `localStorage[SITE.name.toLowerCase() + ":club:unlocked"] === "1"`. With `SITE.name = "AIDive"` (F08) the key is `aidive:club:unlocked`. One line in the console removes the gate for good. | Observation (key value: Inference) | Medium (the mechanism behind F01) | **Real leak** (same root cause as F01). Key confirmed: `aidive:club:unlocked`. | `site/src/components/email-gate.tsx` (`KEY`, `DELAY_MS`, `readUnlocked`) |
| F03 | E9, `1t27yr-aialmx.js` | The gate fails open. A network error, a 6 s timeout, or any response other than `400 {error: "invalid" or "disposable"}` unlocks the page (`console.warn("subscribe failed, unlocking")`). Blocking `/api/subscribe` in DevTools unlocks without an email. | Observation | Low (F01 already exposes the content) | **By design.** The code comment says: "a broken form must never hide a free page". The Worker's `405`, `502 upstream` and `503 disabled` answers also unlock. | `site/src/components/email-gate.tsx`, `site/worker/index.ts` |
| F04 | E4, E5 (endpoint candidate), E9 | The subscribe contract is readable: `POST /api/subscribe`, JSON `{email, lang, source}`, `source = location.pathname + location.search`. The server answers `invalid` and `disposable`, so a disposable-domain filter exists. | Observation | Low (gives a script writer the exact contract) | **By design** (a public form needs a public endpoint). Note: the disposable list has only 10 domains. | `site/worker/index.ts`, `site/worker/disposable-domains.ts` |
| F05 | E9, `1t27yr-aialmx.js` | The request has no consent field. The "I agree to receive AIDive emails" checkbox is only HTML `required`. A scripted call and a checked box look the same to the server. No consent text version or timestamp comes from the client. | Inference | Medium (proof of consent depends on server logging, see U3) | **Real leak** (a confirmed gap, not a data leak). The Worker sends Brevo only `email`, `listIds`, `LANG` and `SOURCE`. It stores no consent flag, timestamp or consent text version. | `site/worker/index.ts` |
| F06 | E9, `1t27yr-aialmx.js` | No anti-bot or anti-CSRF token goes with the subscribe call: no Turnstile, reCAPTCHA or hCaptcha, no CSRF token. Anyone can script the subscription of third-party addresses into the real mailing list. | Inference (server-side rate limits/double opt-in: U3) | Medium to High without rate limit or double opt-in, Low with them (see U3) | **Real leak; severity High.** No rate limit, no Origin check and no double opt-in: the contact is created directly with `POST /v3/contacts`. `request.json()` parses the body whatever its content type, so a cross-site `text/plain` POST needs no CORS preflight. Any website can make its visitors' browsers subscribe any address. Read from the code only; no POST was sent. | `site/worker/index.ts` |
| F07 | E9, `1t27yr-aialmx.js` | `source` takes the query string as is. Any visitor controls a free-text value stored with their subscription, for example `?x=anything`. | Inference | Low (pollution of list attributes) | **By design.** The query string carries UTM attribution: the `/r/<code>` short links add `utm_*`. The Worker cuts `SOURCE` to 120 characters. Free text is still stored. | `site/scripts/emit-md.mjs` (`_redirects`), `site/worker/index.ts` |
| F08 | E8, E9, chunk `3f4cx_6a3wsgs.js` | The whole site config ships as one `JSON.parse('…')` in a shared chunk loaded on both pages: about 59 KB of JSON, with the copy for 15 locales. Public values in it: name, URL, `email: contact@aidive.dev`, YouTube channel, founding date, timezone `Europe/Paris`. Operational values: F08a to F08d. | Observation | Low (Info for the public values) | **Real leak.** `site.ts` imports all of `generated/site.json`. Two client components, `email-gate.tsx` and `locale-switcher.tsx`, import `SITE`, so the bundler ships every key. They use only `name` and the locales. | `site/src/lib/site.ts`, `site/src/components/email-gate.tsx`, `site/src/components/locale-switcher.tsx`, generated by `site/scripts/channel.mjs` from `channel.config.json` |
| F08a | E8, E9, `3f4cx_6a3wsgs.js` | `club.repo = {owner: "aidive-yt", name: "aidive-resources", commitAs: {name: "AI Dive", email: "339050828+aidive-yt@users.noreply.github.com"}}`. It names the repository where the packs probably live, plus the bot commit identity and its GitHub numeric user ID. | Observation | Medium if the repository is public (all packs readable, see U4). Low if private (reconnaissance only) | **By design.** `aidive-yt/aidive-resources` is public (H1: anonymous GitHub API 200). Pack pages link each file "on GitHub". `commitAs` is not used by the site, but the same noreply address is on every public commit of that repo. | `site/src/lib/resources.ts` (`renderResourceHtml`), `channel.config.json` (`club.repo`) |
| F08b | E8, E9, `3f4cx_6a3wsgs.js` | `club.brevoListId = 3`. It confirms the email provider and the target list. | Observation | Low (useless without the Brevo API key) | **Real leak** (Low). Needed only at build time, to write `BREVO_LIST_ID` into `wrangler.jsonc`. The client never reads it. | `channel.config.json`, `site/scripts/channel.mjs` (`club: site.club ?? null`, verbatim) |
| F08c | E8, E9, `3f4cx_6a3wsgs.js` | `club.autoReply.youtube = {dailyCap: 100, breakerErrors: 5}`. It reveals a YouTube auto-reply bot, its daily cap and its circuit-breaker threshold. | Observation | Low (someone who can cause 5 errors knows how to trip the breaker: Inference) | **Real leak** (Low). No code in `engine/site` reads `autoReply`. It reaches the client only because `channel.mjs` copies the club block verbatim. | `channel.config.json`, `site/scripts/channel.mjs` |
| F08d | E8, E9, `3f4cx_6a3wsgs.js` | `contentDir = "../../channel/site/content"`. It shows the build-time monorepo layout. | Observation | Info | **Real leak** (Info). Used only at build time and on the server. | `site/scripts/channel.mjs`, read by `site/src/lib/content.ts` and `site/src/lib/resources.ts` |
| F08e | E4, E8, `3f4cx_6a3wsgs.js` | Every first load downloads the copy for all 15 locales (78 KB raw chunk), whatever the page language. | Observation | Low (performance, not security) | **Real** (performance, same root cause as F08). | `site/src/lib/site.ts`, `site/scripts/channel.mjs` (`copy`) |
| F09 | E4, E5 | No source maps. None of the 19 (club) and 10 (free resource) analyzed scripts declares a `sourceMappingURL`. `source_maps.requested = 0`. | Observation | None (good) | **By design.** `productionBrowserSourceMaps` is not set, and its default is off. | `site/next.config.ts` |
| F10 | E4, E5 (`vendor_fingerprint`) | Stack fingerprint: Next.js (App Router, Turbopack build, RSC payloads) and React. | Inference (REA confidence high and medium) | Info | **By design** (it cannot be hidden in practice). | `site/package.json` |
| F11 | E2, E3 (storage, workers, console) | No localStorage, sessionStorage, IndexedDB or Cache Storage entry, and no worker, before unlock. The console stayed silent during the observation window. | Observation | None (good) | **By design.** The only storage write is the unlock key, after the form (F02). No cookie code exists, and `/club/` sends no `Set-Cookie` (H1). | `site/src/components/email-gate.tsx` |
| F12 | E3 (`dom_urls`) | The gated page links 14 other locale versions (`/fr/`, `/de/`, …, `/zh-TW/`) and `/videos/<slug>/`. Each locale probably ships the same pack under the same gate. | Observation (links), Inference (same exposure) | Info (multiplies F01) | **By design** (i18n). The same exposure as F01 applies to every locale. | `site/src/app/[lang]/club/free-resources/[slug]/page.tsx` |
| F13 | G1; E2, E3 (1 script excluded as other origin) | Each page view loads `static.cloudflareinsights.com/beacon.min.js` and tries `POST /cdn-cgi/rum` (Cloudflare Web Analytics). The privacy copy shipped in `3f4cx_6a3wsgs.js` covers only the unlock flow and does not name it. | Observation (requests), Inference (privacy gap) | Low | **Real leak** (privacy notice gap), **not from the repo.** The layouts render the beacon only when `SITE.club.analyticsToken` is set, and it is not set. The beacon comes from Cloudflare's automatic Web Analytics injection on the zone (dashboard setting). | `site/src/app/(default)/layout.tsx`, `site/src/app/[lang]/layout.tsx` (tag off); notice in `channel/site/copy/<locale>.json` |
| F14 | G1 | Next.js prefetch exposes the route tree: `HEAD` and `__next._tree.txt` / `__next.!KGRlZmF1bHQp….__PAGE__.txt` requests for `/`, `/club/`, `/about/`, `/contact/`, `/club/free-resources/` and the resource slugs. The dynamic segment is `$d$slug` (`[slug]`). | Observation | Info (public routes only) | **By design** (Next.js `<Link>` prefetch, public routes only). | `site/src/app/` route tree |
| F15 | E9, `3f4cx_6a3wsgs.js` and `1t27yr-aialmx.js` | The privacy copy says it stores "the address of that page". The client sends the path and the query string (UTM tags, referral codes, anything). | Inference | Low | **Real leak** (Low, notice wording). `SOURCE` holds up to 120 characters of path and query string. | `channel/site/copy/en.json` (and the 14 other locales), `site/src/components/email-gate.tsx`, `site/worker/index.ts` |
| U1 | E2, E3 (`metadata.responses` empty, `attach_limited`) | Response headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, cache) were not captured, because REA attaches after the page loads. | Unknown | Not rated | **Resolved: real leak, Low to Medium.** H1 `HEAD /club/` returns only `cache-control: public, max-age=0, must-revalidate` and `server: cloudflare`: no CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options or Referrer-Policy. The subscribe form can be framed. | No `_headers` file in the repo; `site/wrangler.jsonc` sets none |
| U2 | E3 (`dom_urls`) | `/llms.txt` and `/feed.xml` are linked from the page. REA did not fetch them. If they carry the pack bodies, they are one more way past the gate. | Unknown | High if they carry pack bodies | **Resolved: false positive** for these files. `llms.txt`, `llms-full.txt` and `feed.xml` list articles and link pack pages, but carry no pack bodies. The same build script does publish the bodies elsewhere: see S1. | `site/src/app/llms.txt/route.ts`, `site/src/app/feed.xml/route.ts`, `site/scripts/emit-md.mjs` |
| U3 | E4, E5 (limitation: "server-side behavior may remain unknown") | Server side of `/api/subscribe`: rate limit, double opt-in, consent logging, disposable list, what reaches Brevo. It cannot be tested without a POST, and POSTs to production are not allowed here. | Unknown | Decides F05 and F06 | **Resolved from source:** none of the four protections exist (F05, F06). `updateEnabled: true` lets anyone overwrite `LANG` and `SOURCE` on an existing contact (S3). | `site/worker/index.ts` |
| U4 | F08a | Whether `aidive-yt/aidive-resources` is public. | Unknown | Decides F08a | **Resolved: public**, and linked from the pack pages (F08a). | H1; `site/src/lib/resources.ts` |
| U5 | E2, E3 (limitations) | Traffic before REA attached (first document, cookies) is not in the REA evidence. REA keeps no cookie or header values. | Unknown | Not rated | **Resolved for cookies: none.** There is no cookie code in `site/src` or `site/worker`, and `/club/` sends no `Set-Cookie` (H1). The guard log G1 holds the full request list. | `site/src`, `site/worker` |

### Step 5 additions: outsider-reachable, found by reading the source

REA did not observe these. Each was confirmed on production with a HEAD request only (H1).

| # | Finding | Severity | Verdict | Source |
|---|---------|----------|---------|--------|
| S1 | `/club/free-resources/<slug>.md` serves each published pack as markdown, with every `{{file:…}}` inlined, and no gate. `HEAD /club/free-resources/claude-code-limit-cut-levers.md` returns `200 text/markdown`. The path follows the same pattern as the `/videos/<slug>.md` alternates that `llms.txt` advertises, so it is easy to guess. | High (the whole pack in machine-readable form) | **Real leak** | `site/scripts/emit-md.mjs` (writes `out/club/free-resources/<rslug>.md`) |
| S2 | Pack files are static assets at `/club/free-resources/<pack>/files/<name>`, with no gate. The gated page lists their download links in its DOM. `HEAD …/haiku-5-5-claude-code-routing/files/README.md` returns `200`. | Medium (the same files are public on GitHub, F08a) | **Real leak** (consistent with the public repo, but it defeats the gate) | `site/scripts/sync-assets.mjs`, `site/src/components/pages/resource-page.tsx` |
| S3 | The Worker sends Brevo `updateEnabled: true`. Resubmitting someone's address overwrites their `LANG` and `SOURCE` attributes. | Low | **Real leak** | `site/worker/index.ts` |

## Method

1. `npm i -g rea-agents@6.5.0`. The npm metadata points at `github.com/morluto/rea` and has no install hooks.
   `REA_MCP_INPUT_SCHEMA_PROFILE=compact rea setup --skill-client claude_code --yes --json` installed only the
   `reverse-engineer-anything` skill. It registers no MCP server, so REA's MCP tools did not load in this session.
   Every tool ran as its CLI equivalent: `rea list-browser-targets`, `rea inspect-web-page`, `rea analyze-web-bundle`,
   `rea capture-web-screenshot` and `rea export-web-scripts`.
2. Headless Chromium 156 ran with `--remote-debugging-port=9222 --remote-debugging-address=127.0.0.1 --user-data-dir=/tmp/rea-chrome`.
3. **No write reached aidive.dev.** A small CDP guard attached to every tab before it navigated.
   It let only GET, HEAD and OPTIONS through and failed every other method. It blocked 6 `POST /cdn-cgi/rum`
   attempts (the Cloudflare beacon) over two browser runs. No request to `/api/subscribe` was made,
   and no non-GET/HEAD/OPTIONS request reached aidive.dev.
   The first run had a guard bug and opened `/club/` three times (GET only). Chromium was restarted from a clean profile for the evidence above.
4. REA runs: `inspect-web-page` with `--observation-ms 3000 --include-accessibility-text --include-console-text --include-json-body-shapes --include-script-sources --include-storage-keys`.
   `analyze-web-bundle` with `--observation-ms 5000 --fetch-source-maps`. All runs were limited to `--allowed-origins https://aidive.dev`.
5. Scripts were exported to `/tmp/rea-audit/scripts-club/` and `/tmp/rea-audit/scripts-free/`, outside the repository.
   They were read with `grep` and a parser only, never executed.
6. Repository contact before step 5: one directory listing at the start of the session showed file names
   in `engine/site/` and `engine/site/worker/` (`disposable-domains.ts`, `index.ts`). No file content was opened.
7. H1 checks in step 5, all read-only: `HEAD` on `/club/`, `/club/free-resources/claude-code-limit-cut-levers.md`,
   `/club/free-resources/haiku-5-5-claude-code-routing/files/README.md` and `/llms-full.txt`.
   Anonymous `GET` on `api.github.com/repos/aidive-yt/aidive-resources` returned 200 (public).
   Anonymous `GET` on `api.github.com/repos/aidive-yt/aidive-site` returned 404 (private to outsiders).
   Because this repository is private, the F08 values are not public anywhere else.
8. No application code was changed.

## Timings

| Step | What | Time |
|------|------|------|
| 1 | Check the npm package, install REA, `rea setup` | 36 s |
| 2 | Write the CDP write guard, start Chromium, open both pages (includes one restart after the guard bug) | 1 min 47 s |
| 3 | REA: targets, inspect ×2, bundle ×2, screenshot ×2, export ×2, plus reading the evidence | 4 min 16 s |
| 4 | Write the outsider report | 1 min 32 s |
| 5 | Read the source, H1 checks, add the Verdict and Source columns | 4 min 30 s |
| | **Total** | **12 min 41 s** |

triage-table-example.md on GitHub

: notre vrai tableau de tri, avec les identifiants de preuve, observation ou inférence ou inconnue, et le verdict par résultat. -

worker-fix.diff

diff --git a/engine/site/worker/index.ts b/engine/site/worker/index.ts
index 994f12fc..e68444e7 100644
--- a/engine/site/worker/index.ts
+++ b/engine/site/worker/index.ts
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
 import { DISPOSABLE } from './disposable-domains';
 
 // Minimal local Workers types: no @cloudflare/workers-types dependency.
-type Env = {
+type RateLimiter = { limit: (options: { key: string }) => Promise<{ success: boolean }> };
+
+export type Env = {
   ASSETS: { fetch: (req: Request) => Promise<Response> };
   BREVO_API_KEY: string;
   BREVO_LIST_ID: string;
+  // The only origin allowed to POST to /api/subscribe, e.g. "https://example.com".
+  SITE_ORIGIN: string;
+  // 5 requests per 60 s per client IP (wrangler `ratelimits`).
+  SUBSCRIBE_LIMITER: RateLimiter;
 };
 
-type SubscribeBody = { email?: string; lang?: string; source?: string };
+type SubscribeBody = { email?: unknown; lang?: unknown; source?: unknown; consent?: unknown };
 
 const EMAIL = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]{2,}$/;
 
@@ -20,6 +26,12 @@ const worker = {
     const url = new URL(request.url);
     if (url.pathname !== '/api/subscribe') return env.ASSETS.fetch(request);
     if (request.method !== 'POST') return new Response(null, { status: 405 });
+    // Browsers always send Origin on a POST: this stops other sites from making
+    // their visitors subscribe addresses. A script can forge it; the rate limit is for that.
+    if (!env.SITE_ORIGIN || request.headers.get('origin') !== env.SITE_ORIGIN) return json(403, { error: 'origin' });
+    const ip = request.headers.get('cf-connecting-ip') ?? 'unknown';
+    const { success } = await env.SUBSCRIBE_LIMITER.limit({ key: ip });
+    if (!success) return json(429, { error: 'rate' });
     // No list id means the club is off for this channel.
     if (!env.BREVO_LIST_ID) return json(503, { error: 'disabled' });
     let body: SubscribeBody;
@@ -30,6 +42,8 @@ const worker = {
     } catch {
       return json(400, { error: 'invalid' });
     }
+    // The form's checkbox must be ticked: only a literal `true` counts as consent.
+    if (body.consent !== true) return json(400, { error: 'consent' });
     const email = (typeof body.email === 'string' ? body.email : '').trim().toLowerCase();
     const source = typeof body.source === 'string' ? body.source : '';
     if (!EMAIL.test(email)) return json(400, { error: 'invalid' });
@@ -37,14 +51,14 @@ const worker = {
     const lang = typeof body.lang === 'string' && /^[a-z]{2}(-[A-Za-z]{2,4})?$/.test(body.lang) ? body.lang : 'en';
     let res: Response;
     try {
+      // No updateEnabled: a request can create a contact, never rewrite an existing one.
       res = await fetch('https://api.brevo.com/v3/contacts', {
         method: 'POST',
         headers: { 'api-key': env.BREVO_API_KEY, 'content-type': 'application/json', accept: 'application/json' },
         body: JSON.stringify({
           email,
           listIds: [Number(env.BREVO_LIST_ID)],
-          updateEnabled: true,
-          attributes: { LANG: lang, SOURCE: source.slice(0, 120) },
+          attributes: { LANG: lang, SOURCE: source.slice(0, 120), CONSENT_AT: new Date().toISOString() },
         }),
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),
       });
@@ -52,12 +66,14 @@ const worker = {
       console.error('brevo fetch', err);
       return json(502, { error: 'upstream' });
     }
-    // 201 created, 204 updated; anything else is Brevo's problem, logged for the dashboard.
-    if (res.status !== 201 && res.status !== 204) {
-      console.error('brevo', res.status, await res.text());
-      return json(502, { error: 'upstream' });
-    }
-    return new Response(null, { status: 204 });
+    // 201 created. An existing contact answers 400 duplicate_parameter: it is left
+    // untouched and the visitor gets the same 204, so the answer never tells whether
+    // an address is already on the list.
+    if (res.status === 201) return new Response(null, { status: 204 });
+    const detail = await res.text();
+    if (res.status === 400 && detail.includes('duplicate_parameter')) return new Response(null, { status: 204 });
+    console.error('brevo', res.status, detail);
+    return json(502, { error: 'upstream' });
   },
 };
 
diff --git a/engine/site/wrangler.template.jsonc b/engine/site/wrangler.template.jsonc
index e132f254..b007fd8e 100644
--- a/engine/site/wrangler.template.jsonc
+++ b/engine/site/wrangler.template.jsonc
@@ -3,7 +3,11 @@
   "main": "worker/index.ts",
   "compatibility_date": "2026-08-13",
   "compatibility_flags": ["nodejs_compat"],
-  "vars": { "BREVO_LIST_ID": "{{brevoListId}}" },
+  "vars": { "BREVO_LIST_ID": "{{brevoListId}}", "SITE_ORIGIN": "{{origin}}" },
+  // /api/subscribe: 5 requests per 60 s per client IP, 429 above. The counter is
+  // per Cloudflare location and eventually consistent. namespace_id is unique to
+  // this limiter in the account.
+  "ratelimits": [{ "name": "SUBSCRIBE_LIMITER", "namespace_id": "1001", "simple": { "limit": 5, "period": 60 } }],
   "assets": {
     "directory": "./out/",
     "binding": "ASSETS",

worker-fix.diff on GitHub

: le changement du Worker que nous avons livré, sous forme de diff. -

_headers

# Security headers for every static asset (Cloudflare Workers static assets).
# They do not cover responses the Worker builds itself (/api/subscribe).
# script-src needs 'unsafe-inline': the static export inlines Next's RSC payload
# scripts, and a static site cannot send per-request nonces.
# www.youtube.com: the iframe API and the embedded player (video pages).
# static.cloudflareinsights.com / cloudflareinsights.com: the Web Analytics
# beacon that Cloudflare injects from the dashboard setting (audit F13).
/*
  Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://www.youtube.com https://static.cloudflareinsights.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' https://cloudflareinsights.com; frame-src https://www.youtube.com; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; object-src 'none'
  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000

_headers on GitHub

: le fichier de headers de sécurité pour les assets statiques sur Cloudflare Workers. -

check-client-bundle.mjs

// Fails the build when the server-only channel config reaches the browser.
// Client components must import @/lib/site-client, never @/lib/site: one client
// import of @/lib/site ships the whole generated config (club settings, the
// build layout and every locale's copy) in a JS chunk. Run after `next build`.
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';

const STATIC_DIR = path.resolve('out', '_next', 'static');
// Keys that exist only in src/generated/site.json, never in site-client.json.
const SERVER_ONLY_KEYS = ['"contentDir"', '"brevoListId"', '"autoReply"', '"commitAs"', '"spokenName"', '"foundingDate"'];

function* jsFiles(dir) {
  for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
    const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
    if (entry.isDirectory()) yield* jsFiles(full);
    else if (entry.name.endsWith('.js')) yield full;
  }
}

if (!fs.existsSync(STATIC_DIR)) {
  console.error(`[check-client-bundle] ${STATIC_DIR} is missing: run next build first`);
  process.exit(1);
}
const leaks = [];
let files = 0;
for (const file of jsFiles(STATIC_DIR)) {
  files += 1;
  const text = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
  const found = SERVER_ONLY_KEYS.filter((key) => text.includes(key));
  if (found.length) leaks.push(`${path.relative(process.cwd(), file)}: ${found.join(', ')}`);
}
if (leaks.length) {
  console.error('[check-client-bundle] server-only config reached the client bundle:');
  for (const leak of leaks) console.error(`  ${leak}`);
  console.error('A client component imports @/lib/site (directly or through @/lib/i18n). Use @/lib/site-client and @/lib/locales.');
  process.exit(1);
}
console.log(`[check-client-bundle] ${files} client scripts, no server-only config`);

check-client-bundle.mjs on GitHub

: une étape de build qui échoue quand une clé de config réservée au serveur atteint un fichier livré. -

README.md

The REA self-audit kit: the two prompts we gave Claude Code in the sandbox (audit, then fix), our real triage table, and the Worker, header and bundle-check changes we shipped.

README.md on GitHub

: ce que contient le kit, en un paragraphe.

À faire lundi

  • Ouvrez un bac à sable jetable sur votre dépôt, ou une machine virtuelle locale, et ne lancez jamais l'audit sur votre propre machine.
  • Installez REA depuis le paquet officiel, épinglé sur une version, avec le profil de schémas compact.
  • Lancez un navigateur sur un port de débogage loopback avec un profil vierge et bloquez toute requête d'écriture avant le chargement de la moindre page.
  • Donnez à REA une URL exacte et lancez prompt-1-audit.md. Commitez le rapport avant d'ouvrir le moindre fichier source.
  • Marquez chaque résultat observation, inférence ou inconnue, puis vraie fuite, voulu par conception ou faux positif. Notez les cas voulus avec leur coût.
  • Cherchez dans votre JavaScript livré vos propres clés de config, et ajoutez check-client-bundle.mjs au build.
  • Mettez une vérification de l'Origin, un rate limit et un flag de consentement côté serveur sur chaque endpoint qui appelle un service payant.
  • Relancez les mêmes étapes REA, rejouez chaque correctif avec curl, puis ouvrez la pull request avec les deux rapports dans son corps.

Pour aller plus loin

Double opt-in. Un Origin falsifié par un script, plus de nombreuses IP, peut encore abonner d'autres personnes, car le limiteur de Cloudflare compte par emplacement et est cohérent à terme s13. L'endpoint de double opt-in de Brevo demande un template, une URL de redirection et un ID de liste, et le contact ne rejoint la liste qu'après le clic s14. Nous ne l'avons pas livré dans cette pull request.

Headers de réponse sur les réponses du Worker. Notre fichier _headers ne couvre que les assets statiques. Les réponses que le Worker construit lui-même, comme /api/subscribe, n'obtiennent pas ces headers. Définissez-les dans le code du Worker. Notre script-src conserve aussi 'unsafe-inline', dont l'export statique a besoin.

La notice de confidentialité. Notre texte de confidentialité dit qu'il stocke l'adresse de la page, mais le champ source stocké contient aussi la query string. C'est une modification de formulation dans chaque fichier de locale, et un bon exemple de résultat qui n'est pas du code. Si vous gardez une balise d'analytics injectée depuis un tableau de bord, nommez-la aussi dans le texte de confidentialité.

Ce que nous avons laissé ouvert. HSTS tourne sans includeSubDomains ni preload tant que l'on ne sait pas que chaque sous-domaine sert du HTTPS. La CSP avec la balise d'analytics injectée n'a pas pu être observée en local, donc relancez l'audit sur le site en ligne après le déploiement.

Autres comptes rendus. Le fil Hacker News sur REA contient la critique la plus acérée et une lecture de défenseur : garder le plus possible côté serveur s8. Deux essais écrits sur l'app d'une personne listent des résultats et proposent des correctifs sans les appliquer ni relancer l'audit s9 s10.

FAQ

Est-il légal de lancer REA sur ma propre app ? Le disclaimer de REA couvre l'analyse licite de logiciels que vous possédez ou que vous êtes autorisé à examiner s1. Votre propre site entre dans ce cadre. Celui de quelqu'un d'autre, non, sauf autorisation écrite.

Pourquoi ne pas le lancer sur mon portable ? Les notes de sécurité du projet disent que ce n'est pas un bac à sable s4. Il pilote un navigateur et exécute des outils téléchargés, donc une machine jetable garde tout dégât à l'intérieur. Kosuke, le bac à sable que nous avons utilisé, nous a donné un accès gratuit à sa meilleure formule, mais une machine virtuelle locale ou un conteneur fait le même travail. Si vous choisissez Kosuke, entrez le code AIDIVE2026 dans le champ « Promo code » juste après l'inscription pour obtenir 30 $ de crédits au lieu de 10 $.

La barrière email de mon contenu gratuit doit-elle passer côté serveur ? Seulement si le contenu n'est pas fait pour être gratuit. Un contenu présent dans la page statique est lisible sans la barrière, qui demande donc poliment sans rien imposer. Nous avons gardé la nôtre volontairement et noté la raison résultat par résultat. Un contenu payant ou réservé aux membres ne doit jamais entrer dans l'export statique s11.

Un rate limit seul ferme-t-il la faille d'inscription ? Non. Il ralentit un déluge, mais un script peut falsifier le header Origin et le limiteur compte par emplacement s13. Associez-le à un consentement vérifié côté serveur et, idéalement, à un double opt-in.

Les outils de REA n'apparaissent pas après le setup. Que faire ? Dans notre essai, le setup a installé la skill mais aucun serveur d'outils, et Claude Code a utilisé la version en ligne de commande de chaque outil. Appelez les mêmes étapes depuis le terminal au lieu de redémarrer.

Fichiers